Treating violence like a contagious disease could help save young lives
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, youth homicides in Boston more than tripled—from 22 in 1987 to 73 in 1990. Searching for anything that could save these young lives, city officials and community members came up with Operation Ceasefire. This was a radical shift in how law enforcement responded to violence. Instead of investigation and punishment, Ceasefire workers would instead find youth who were most in danger of gun-violence and meet them face-to-face. They had a simple message: If there was violence, it would be met with a swift and certain response. This accountability served as a powerful deterrent.
Within two years, the number of youth homicides in Boston dropped to 10. Overall, the project has been credited with a 63 percent reduction in Boston’s youth homicide rate and significant reductions in shots fired, calls for service, and gun-related assaults. The reduction in violence and homicides was so surprising, the program became known as the “Boston Miracle.”
For years, no one could explain why Ceasefire was so successful. Then, in 1999, an epidemiologist named Gary Slutkin observed that violence moved through neighborhoods like a contagious disease, with a single incident leading to even more violence, the same way infected cells become nodes in a network of viral reproduction. Without a strong socioeconomic immune system to stop transmission, certain communities would keep being plagued by violence. This led to an aspirational vision: If violence behaves like a disease, perhaps it can be diagnosed, treated, and even cured. If it was possible to find youth who were most at risk of causing harm or becoming victims, it might be possible to “slow the spread” of violence.
This public health approach has since become a key part of an important violence prevention strategy: community violence intervention (CVI). In a new report, Resident Fellow Logan Seacrest presents evidence for this approach and includes policy recommendations for those who want to pursue this strategy. He argues that by treating violence as a public health problem, CVI programs can protect vulnerable communities. Further, by removing law enforcement from the equation entirely, CVI goes beyond just a “limited government solution” and could actually be called a “no government solution.”
As Seacrest points out, “[y]outh violence in the United States is a significant problem, second only to car crashes as the leading cause of death among children and adolescents….[t]raditional juvenile justice methods alone have proven insufficient to curb this devastating public safety issue. The goal of CVI is to reduce homicides and assaults through proactive, direct engagement with those most at risk of either perpetrating or being victimized by violence.”
As policymakers on both sides of the aisle work to fight youth violence, Seacrest urges everyone to remember that there are a few components necessary for CVI programs to be successful. He concludes, “[f]irst, government stakeholders need to be open to new forms of community collaboration, committed to sharing both power and funding. Second, law enforcement needs to be comfortable working with individuals who may have a criminal record. Finally, adequate funding needs to be dedicated to CVI programs to not only protect frontline workers, but to track data items necessary for ongoing program improvements. As the evidence supporting CVI continues to accumulate, so does our knowledge of what works.”
Read the full report here.